I work primarily at the intersection of metaphysics and philosophy of language, with a special focus on issues related to vagueness, indeterminacy of meaning, and meta-ontology. I have additional interests in meta-ethics (esp. expressivism), philosophical logic, formal epistemology, and rational choice theory.
I grew up in Flint, Michigan and attended Columbia University in New York City where I studied economics and philosophy. After a brief stint in investment banking, I returned to my home state to pursue a PhD in Philosophy at the University of Michigan.
I am currently an assistant professor at Virginia Tech.
My partner, Mercedes Maria Corredor, is also a philosopher!
(forthcoming at The Journal of Philosophy)
The indeterminacy considerations raised by Hilary Putnam have motivated the thought that, among the semantic values for predicates, some are more eligible than others. I extend these Putnam-style considerations to include the semantic values for logical vocabulary. The result is a new argument for Ted Sider's thesis that some candidate semantic values for our logical vocabulary are more eligible than others.
(published in The Journal of Philosophy)
I explore the relationship between (i) quantifier variantism (ii) vague existence and (iii) metaphysical vagueness. I argue that the quantifier variantist is committed to a particularly robust sort of vague existence, which entails a subtle and novel sort of metaphysical vagueness. Along the way, I clarify the notions of vague existence and metaphysical vagueness, and offer new arguments linking restricted composition to vague existence and linking vague existence to metaphysical vagueness.
(published in Analysis)
Kit Fine introduced the notion of grounding in order to help us state and resolve so-called "questions of realism". Ted Sider has argued that his notion of metaphysical semantics is better suited for the task. I disagree and defend the grounding theorist.
(published in Inquiry; for symposium on Amie Thomasson's Norms and Necessity)
I explore the conception of a "semantic rule" underlying Thomasson's modal normativism, especially in the context of a posteriori necessities.
(published in Routledge Handbook on Metametaphysics)
Discussion of the meta-ontological thesis of quantifier variance
(published in Ethics)
I use conceptual role semantics for moral terms to explain moral vagueness without ontic vagueness, responding to the argument in Schoenfield (2016) that moral vagueness is ontic vagueness.
(published in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics)
I propose a view that mimics genuine metaphysical vagueness, according to which the term 'natural' and its cognates are vague and the source of the vagueness is semantic.
(published in Synthese)
Using tools from the problem of the many, I argue that the best account of vagueness is one in which we are simultaneously speaking many languages, tokening many sentences, and asserting many propositions.
(published in Philosophical Studies)
I explore, in the context of Elga's (2010) dutch strategy, a decision rule for agents with imprecise or vague credences.