I work primarily at the intersection of metaphysics and philosophy of language. At the most general level, I am interested in debates over realism, broadly construed. For a host of phenomena (modal, normative, mathematical, nomic, probabilistic etc.) I am interested in the (admittedly obscure) question: does the source of the phenomena lie in our representations (our language or thought) or in the world being represented?
I approach these questions via the study of vagueness and indeterminacy. That approach comes from two angles. First, I ask whether vagueness and indeterminacy is a representational or a worldly phenomenon. (I believe it is the former.) Second, I ask what vagueness and indeterminacy can teach us regarding debates over realism regarding morality, ontology, fundamentality, etc. (I believe it can teach us quite a lot.)
I have additional interests in metaethics, rational choice, epistemology (esp. formal), and philosophical logic.
I grew up in Flint, Michigan and attended Columbia University in New York City where I studied economics and philosophy. After a brief stint in investment banking, I returned to my home state to pursue a PhD in Philosophy at the University of Michigan. I graduated in September 2016 and am currently an assistant professor at Ryerson University in Toronto.
(forthcoming in Routledge Handbook on Metametaphysics)
a discussion of the meta-ontological thesis of quantifier variance
(published in Ethics)
uses conceptual role semantics for moral terms to explain moral vagueness without ontic vagueness; responds to the argument in Schoenfield (2016) that moral vagueness is ontic vagueness
(published in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics)
proposes a view that mimics geniune metaphysical vagueness, according to which the term 'natural' and its cognates are vague and the source of the vagueness is semantic; shows the view rebuts an argument schema pervasive in metaphysics
(published in Synthese)
uses tools from the problem of the many to argue that the best account of vaguenes is one in which we are simultaneously speaking many languages, tokening many sentences, and asserting many propositions
(published in Philosophical Studies)
explores, in the context of Elga's (2010) dutch strategy, a decision rule for agents with imprecise or vague credences